Reformation of economic policies during Ayube Khan



                     Reformation of economic policies during Ayube Khan
 
 
Background:
                     
There is a huge disconnect between the economic challenges Pakistan faces, some of which are very complex requiring skilled economic minds, and the way economic policy-making is conducted. In the initial years after Partition, economic policy-making was dominated by the CSPs who selected by unquestionable high standards of the exams they had to pass to qualify, were deemed to know everything. They could run the Cabinet Division one day, an airline the next, or be a central bank governor the day after that, with equal competence and efficiency. Professionals and more specifically professionals in economics had no place in their scheme of things.
First Agricultural Reforms:
First agricultural reforms in Pakistan were introduced by General Ayub Khan in Jan 24, 1959. According to these reforms an individual was not allowed to own 500 irrigated and 1000 of non-irrigated land in Pakistan. The remaining lands were given freely to the landless farmers. It was also narrated that no surcharge or extra money will be taken from any landless person in retuI.
 Agricultural growth, inequality and loan:
The military coup d’etat, which brought General Ayub Khan into power, established the
dominance of military and bureaucracy in Pakistan’s power structure. The associated
political system while it weakened the nascent democratic institutions of the legislature,
press and the judiciary, constituted authoritarian power behind a  civilian facade called
“basic democracy”. The economic strategy  of the government, while it induced rapid
GDP growth, sharply accentuated inter-personal and inter-regional inequalities, which
generated explosive political tensions. These tensions erupted in a mass movement
Against President Ayub Khan in West Pakistan and a national independence movement in
East Pakistan that culminated in the emergence of the new state of Bangladeshrn for the transfer of land.
 
Land Reforms:
The first of our self-styled saviour generals also disliked the notion of feudalism. A commission was set up present recommendations and it presented its report within three months of the military takeover in January, 1959. Deemed “radical” by the then military junta, it side stepped the issue of ceilings on land holdings by proposing a fairly liberal one and was in its own words “pragmatic” and “middle-of-the-road” – an often abused set of terms used to represent anything that cannot be handled appropriately due to political realities. In reality, it was far from revolutionary.
Recommendations included:-
·         A ceiling of 500 acres for irrigated and 1000 acres for un-irrigated land be imposed with due compensation to owners (the complex issue of Produce Index Unit has been left in this essay). Land was to be redistributed amongst to tenants already cultivating the land.
·         Abolition of Jagirs which had already been abolished in Punjab and NWFP in 1950. However, the 1.1 million acres of Jagirs in Sind were abolished alongwith 150 and 258 acres in Bahawalpur and Balochistan respectively.
·         Permanent proprietary rights for occupancy tenants.
·         Idea of “economic holdings” and “subsistence holdings” of no less than 50 acres was proposed in order to consolidate holdings (in reality economic holdings was supposed to create a middle class amongst the peasantry and to attract private investment in agriculture).
One person however dissented with the majority opinion on the land ceiling recommended and his name was Ghulam Ishaq Khan, later to become the serial 58-2(b) user. GIK viewed the imposed limit as way too liberal and he thought that “the net effect of the proposed measures … [will leave] the concentration of land in families instead of individuals”. Therefore, he proposed the ceiling of 150 acres and 450 acres for irrigated/un-irrigated land alongwith a 300/900 acres limit for families to own land (irrigated/un-irrigated). He also dissented on a number of other issues (exemptions for orchards, transfer of land by gift, etc.). Clearly, GIK was the “revolutionary” amongst the committee members.
Industrial Reforms:
His era witnessed rapid industrial progress (mainly in the western wing of the country) with two five-year economic development plans. However his so-called 1958-68 "development decade" actually became a decade of exploitation and deliberate promotion of inequality between classes and regions with the 22 big industrial families amassing most of the wealth. The record reveals that Pakistan's Second Year Plan (1960-1965), the one that covered a good part of the martial law period, was a substantial success from a statistical point of view. But there was little overall improvement in the life-style of the general population.
 
President Ayub Khan introduced industrial development program under the doctrine of "functional inequality on the familiar plea that government should tolerate "some initial growth in income inequalities to reach high levels of saving and investment." This growth was to be achieved through a system under which income inequalities were to be permitted for a long time until the benefits of such a system would trickle down to the disadvantaged groups at the later stage.
 
Dr. Mahbub ul Haq, probably the most influential adviser of his government and drafter of the Second Five-Year Plan, was responsible for much of the thinking embodied in the Plan. He accepted the proposition that "the route to equality lay through inequality" on the ground that during the earlier phase of industrialization such inequality was inevitable. He argued that "the under-developed countries must consciously accept a philosophy of growth and shelve for the distant future all ideas of equitable distribution and welfare state. It should be recognized that these are luxuries which only developed countries can afford."
 
The theory of "social utility of greed" was also championed by Pakistan's Harvard adviser to the Planning Commission, Gustav F. Papanek, who advocated that income inequalities not only contributed to the growth of the economy but also made possible a real improvement for the lower-income groups. In his work on Pakistan's economic development model pursued in the sixties, Gustav Papanek defended the very high rates of profit allowed to the private sector on the plea that since the bulk of these profits were being reinvested, they produced economic growth which was essential for reducing poverty and thereby reducing inequality.
 
 
The policy of income inequality between classes was pursued simultaneously with a policy of regional inequality in terms of East and West Pakistan and in terms of regions within West Pakistan. During the decade 1959-60 to 1969-70, per capita gross domestic product in terms of 1959-60 constant prices grew only by 17 percent in East Pakistan, but by 42 percent in West Pakistan. The central government also conceded that disparity measured by the difference between per capita incomes in West and East Pakistan expressed as a percentage of the per capita income of all Pakistan had increased from 38.1 percent in 1964-65 to 47.1 percent in 1969-70.
 Industrial Growth, Inequality and Loan Dependence:
The decade of the 1960s is seen by many as the ‘golden age’ in terms of the high growth
rates achieved through the provision of subsidies and tariff protection to industry and an
elite farmer strategy in agriculture. It was also a period when the mold was set for the
emergence of an economic structure that was to lock Pakistan’s economy into increasing
income inequality, a narrow and inefficient industrial base, and increasing loan
dependence, for the next four decades. 
Following the Korean boom in 1953, the government had introduced a policy framework
for inducing the large profits of traders in jute and raw cotton to flow into the
manufacturing sector. This was attempted through a policy of encouraging the domestic
production of consumer goods through a variety of protection measures during the
1950s
During the 1960s import substitution industrial growth in the consumer goods sector, was
more systematically encouraged by the government
 Planning Commission:
 The third period of the planning process began in October 1958 with the assumption of power by the military government of Ayub Khan.  The new regime chooses to make economic development through a marked economy and reliance of the private sector as its primary objective.  The new government gave proper attention to achieve the following targets:
 
        Rapid industrialization in the country,
        Removal of food shortage,
        Removal of political instability, and
        To overcome the problem of deficit of balance of payment.
 
The status of the Planning Commission was raised to a Division in the President’s secretariat.  The President himself assumed the chairmanship of the Planning Commission and Deputy Chairman, with the ex-officio status of a minister, was made the operational head of the Commission.  Provincial planning department was organized.  The Planning Commission was also provided the secretariat for National Economic Council (NEC) which looked after the day-to-day work of NEC and was also responsible for final approval for annual development.
 
During this period the Second Five-Year Plan (1960-65) and the Third Five-Year Plan (1965-70) was made.  Second Five-Year Plan was so successful that Pakistan led to an example for hunger nations of the world.  But unfortunately Pakistan had to fight war against India in 1965.  Then there was a hue and cry against Ayub government and another government got the power.
Trade:
 
The magnitude of protection provided by the government to private sector industry was
such that it enabled domestic manufacturers to earn large rupee profits on the production
of goods that were not internationally competitive. It has been estimated that during the
1960s, Pakistan’s main industries (when input costs and output values are both measured
in dollar terms) were producing negative value added. Indirect subsidies such as the
Bonus Voucher Scheme combined with the overvalued exchange rate, enabled domestic
manufacturers to earn large rupee profits on exports that brought no gain to the economy
in terms of foreign exchange.  It has been argued that the phenomenon of negative value added in industry was an important reason why during the 1960s, in spite of import substitution and large export volumes, foreign exchange shortages persisted
 
 Bonus Voucher Scheme:
The bonus voucher scheme is enabled exports of certain manufactured goods to receive in addition to the rupee revenue of their exports, bonus vouchers equivalent to a specified percentage of the foreign exchange earned. The vouchers could be sold in the market (to potential importers) for a price usually 150 to 180 percent above the face value. Thus the exporter not only earned the rupee revenues from exports but also an additional premium through sale of the bonus vouchers

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